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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The purpose of this Essay is to examine Choi and Gulati’s concept 
of designing a “tournament of judges,”1 with particular focus on 
whether it would be useful in the Antipodes (Australia and New Zea-
land). Focusing on Australia and New Zealand offers an interesting 
comparison with the United States and allows one to flesh out some 
of the issues associated with designing a tournament in countries 
with seriatim opinion writing and no judicial conference. There are 
some similarities in terms of promotion arrangements (for example, 
in New Zealand most members of the Court of Appeal are promoted 
from the High Court2) and some differences (for example, in Austra-
lia promotion to the High Court comes from one of several courts or 
from private practice3). There are also differences in the appointment 
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 1. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 
(2004). 
 2. Note that in New Zealand, the New Zealand High Court is for all intents and pur-
poses the second highest court, akin to the courts of appeals in the United States, while the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal is the final court of appeal, akin to the United States Su-
preme Court.  
 3. In Australia, the High Court of Australia is the final court of appeal. Below the 
High Court of Australia is the Federal Court of Australia, which is broadly similar to the 
United States courts of appeals and the state supreme courts. If a judge is to be promoted 
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process. One of Choi and Gulati’s main rationales for formulating a 
tournament of judges is that the process of appointment to the 
United States Supreme Court is so politicized. This is less so in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. The judges of the High Court of Australia 
and the New Zealand Court of Appeal are appointed by the Governor 
General, who is the representative of the Queen of the United King-
dom, on the advice of the relevant national government.4 Thus it is 
effectively the government that makes the decision on who to ap-
point, but without the series of Senate hearings into the background 
of the candidate, which characterizes the appointment process in the 
United States. 
 Having said this, the appointment process in Australia and New 
Zealand still lacks transparency. Governments in both countries are 
under no obligation to consult with state governments (relevant in 
the Australian case), the judiciary, or the profession more generally, 
and with the exception of a few spasmodic anecdotal accounts,5 ex-
actly how appointments are made is largely shrouded in mystery. 
The basic notion that some of that nontransparency could be cleared 
up if the government would provide hard data about judicial per-
formance to back its claim that a particular judge is the best candi-
date for a position still holds. 
 There is ongoing debate in Australia and New Zealand on the is-
sue of how judges should be selected, with some arguing for public 
scrutiny of the opinions and attitudes of judges similar to what oc-
curs in the United States.6 There is also continuing controversy over 
whether the High Court of Australia should be more representative 
of the population (for example, in terms of gender, there has only 
ever been one female judge on the High Court of Australia) and the 
implications this would have for judicial performance.7 Former Chief 
Justice of the High Court of Australia, Sir Anthony Mason, has 
stated that while a more representative judiciary “may assist in 
                                                                                                                     
to the High Court from a lower court, it will typically be from the Federal Court or one of 
the state supreme courts.  
 4. For a discussion of the judicial selection process in New Zealand, see Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer, Judicial Selection and Accountability: Can the New Zealand System Survive?, in 
COURTS AND POLICY: CHECKING THE BALANCE 11 (B.D. Gray & R.B. McClintock eds., 
1995). For a discussion of the judicial selection process in Australia, see George Winterton, 
Appointment of Federal Judges in Australia, 16 MELB. U. L. REV. 185 passim (1987).  
 5. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 4, at 40-52; Winterton, supra note 4, at 185-88. 
 6. Catriona MacLennan, Cast the Net Wider for Effective Judges, N.Z. HERALD, May 
10, 2004, at 13; David Solomon, Judge Backs Scrutiny of High Court, COURIER-MAIL (Bris-
bane, Austl.), Mar. 21, 1997, at 14. 
 7. A similar debate on “representativeness,” or “diversity,” in the judiciary is occur-
ring in the United Kingdom, particularly since the passage of the Human Rights Act, 1998, 
c. 42. The Act made the European Convention on Human Rights a part of United Kingdom 
law, giving the English what is, in effect, a bill of rights. For a discussion of these issues in 
the United Kingdom context, see Sir Sydney Kentridge, The Highest Court: Selecting the 
Judges, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55, 56-65 (2003). 
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maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice, . . . it 
is essential that [it] be achieved without any diminution in the qual-
ity of judicial performance. The insistent demand for enhanced judi-
cial performance requires the appointment of those who are best 
qualified.”8 If Australia was to go down that track, the notion of a 
tournament of judges would become more pressing. In Australia, 
there is also continuous discussion of the merits (or lack thereof) of 
introducing performance standards raised by law societies,9 to which 
quantitative indicators of the sort suggested by Choi and Gulati 
would be a useful contribution. One difference, however, between 
what Australia would use the tournament for and the manner in 
which Choi and Gulati set up their tournament is that the debate in 
Australia tends to center on prescribing minimum standards to get 
the below-average judges up to scratch rather than setting indicators 
designed to identify the highfliers.  
II.   WHAT IS HOMO ECONOMICUS? 
 The issue whether judges behave as homo economicus (economic 
man) is a useful starting point, because the premise underpinning 
Choi and Gulati’s tournament of judges is that judges respond to in-
centives.10 The view was long held that judges were immune to self-
interest.11 From the late 1990s, however, sparked mainly by Posner’s 
seminal work on judicial decisionmaking,12 a few articles started to 
appear that argued that judges, like the rest of us, are self-interested 
and respond to incentives.13 While the notion that judges are self-
interested welfare maximizers has not been unanimously accepted,14 
it has taken root in law and economics’ treatment of judicial behav-
                                                                                                                     
 8. David Hodgkinson, Why Judges Should Not Be Seen as Representatives, 
AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Oct. 18, 1995, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 9. Janet Fife-Yeomans, Tougher Guidelines Needed for Judges: QC, AUSTRALIAN, 
Nov. 1, 1995, at 6. 
 10. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 305. 
 11. Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of 
Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 827-32. 
 12. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993). 
 13. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Deci-
sion-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 946-48 (1995); Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Fu-
ture of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 839-43; Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, 
and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 627-32 (1994); Frederick Schauer, In-
centives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 615, 619-21 (2000). 
 14. For criticisms, see Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Deci-
sion Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1653 n.44 (2003) (“[I do not] give much credence to 
the theory that judges are self-interested pursuers of prestige, reputation, careerist ambi-
tion, or influence.”); and Lynn A. Stout, Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1605, 1609 (2002) (“[T]he modern judiciary rests on the expectation that judges will 
behave in an altruistic fashion.”). 
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ior. The notion of self-interest has always been at the center of neo-
classical economics. Bowles and Gintis note that generations of stu-
dents have been told that “[t]he strength of the neoclassical para-
digm . . . lies in its hardheaded grounding in a general model of self-
interested action.”15 The role of self-interest in the economics litera-
ture, though, has evolved over time. Bowles and Gintis further sug-
gest that “self-interested behavior underlying neoclassical theory is 
artificially truncated: it depicts a charmingly Victorian but utopian 
world in which conflicts abound but a handshake is a handshake.”16 
The reality, of course, is more complex. In the 1970s, a new homo 
economicus started to emerge in the principal-agent, the economics of 
information, and the radical political economy literature that re-
flected these complexities in human behavior. “The new economic 
man is not a Victorian gentleman: he is uncompromisingly thorough 
in pursuing objectives, and often he is less benign.”17   
 Williamson suggests that the new homo economicus will engage in 
a “full set of ex ante and ex post efforts to lie, cheat, steal, mislead, 
disguise, obfuscate, feign, distort, and confuse.”18 If homo economicus 
behaves like this, one’s initial reaction might be that it is ridiculous 
to suggest that judges behave in this fashion. To take an extreme ex-
ample, most would agree that it is absurd to postulate that judges (or 
most judges) are likely to expend effort on stealing. But, at the same 
time, this is also true for most members of the broader community. 
Judges, along with members of the broader community, might, how-
ever, engage in shirking of work effort, which represents a form of 
theft of time. And judges might engage in behavior designed to mis-
lead or disguise their real output. The point is that homo economicus 
will behave in an opportunistic manner to achieve his self-interested 
objectives. It is important to take this into account when designing 
incentives to improve performance and mechanisms to monitor their 
implementation.  
III.   WHAT MOTIVATES JUDGES TO PERFORM? 
A.   Financial Incentives 
 Before we can say anything about how to measure judicial per-
formance and how such measurements will affect judicial behavior, it 
is important to say something about what motivates judges. If it is 
accepted that judges do indeed respond to incentives, an examination 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested 
Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1993, at 83, 83. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 84. 
 18. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 51 n.8 
(1985). 
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of the motives of judges will shed light on the most appropriate in-
centive structure. In Australia and New Zealand, as in the United 
States, associate judges of the same court get paid the same amount. 
Given there are often sizeable differences in output across judges, 
wages do not reflect marginal product. The compensation of judges 
does not depend on their rulings, and the quality of the precedents 
set by the judge does not result in any direct pecuniary benefit.19 
From time to time, judges have expressed dissatisfaction with their 
compensation in the face of mounting workloads in both Australia 
and the United States.20 In Australia, the issue of judicial compensa-
tion was a major issue at the last election in 2004, with the Federal 
opposition stating that if elected, it intended to abolish the present 
noncontributory judicial pension scheme and replace it with commu-
nity-standard superannuation arrangements (the opposition was de-
feated). In part, this was a response to the blowout in the unfunded 
liability for judicial pensions. The law societies responded by arguing 
that this would have an adverse effect on the ability to attract the 
best people to the bench.21 There is some evidence that pension enti-
tlements influence the retirement decisions of judges. Squire22 and 
Zorn and Van Winkle23 find that pension eligibility has a statistically 
significant positive effect on the propensity to retire from the United 
States Supreme Court. Spriggs and Wahlbeck reach the same con-
clusion for the United States courts of appeals,24 although Barrow 
and Zuk25 and Hall26 find that financial incentives are less important 
in the lower federal courts and state supreme courts, respectively. 
Maitra and Smyth find that pension eligibility has a significant posi-
tive effect on the retirement decision in the High Court of Australia.27 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Coşgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making, 
23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 34 (1994); cf. Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial 
Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 137-38 (1980) (suggesting that there is little economic 
payoff from “good” judging). 
 20. See Albert Yoon, Love’s Labor’s Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court 
Judges: 1945-2000, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029 (2003). 
 21. Chris Merritt, Latham Puts Judges’ Pay on Agenda, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Feb. 
19, 2004, at 3; Chris Merritt, Parity Call for Judges’ Pension Plan, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., 
Feb. 14, 2004, at 3. 
 22. Peverill Squire, Politics and Personal Factors in Retirement from the United 
States Supreme Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 180, 185-86 (1988). 
 23. Christopher J.W. Zorn & Steven R. Van Winkle, A Competing Risks Model of Su-
preme Court Vacancies, 1789-1992, 22 POL. BEHAV. 145, 154-55 (2000). 
 24. James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893-1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573, 590-91 (1995). 
 25. Deborah J. Barrow & Gary Zuk, An Institutional Analysis of Turnover in the 
Lower Federal Courts, 1900-1987, 52 J. POL. 457, 466-69 (1990). 
 26. Melinda Gann Hall, Voluntary Retirements from State Supreme Courts: Assessing 
Democratic Pressures to Relinquish the Bench, 63 J. POL. 1112, 1130 (2001). 
 27. Pushkar Maitra & Russell Smyth, Determinants of Retirement on the High Court 
of Australia, 81 ECON. REC. (forthcoming Dec. 2005) (manuscript at 20-22, on file with au-
thor). 
1304  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1299 
 
 Nevertheless, it is highly questionable whether there is much 
scope to improve judicial performance through improved financial 
rewards. The reason is that it is unlikely that many judges are moti-
vated by financial returns. Monetary compensation only represents a 
small portion of the returns to judging, and it is a diminishing pro-
portion the higher the court, because on higher courts the nonmone-
tary returns are higher.28 While there are no studies on this point, 
the decision to take a judicial appointment is reflected in the facts. 
The opportunity cost of judging, purely in terms of monetary income, 
is high. Most judges would have been earning considerably more in 
private practice and, as such, give up substantial monetary incomes 
to join the bench.29 Similarly, most judges could earn more by resign-
ing from the bench and returning to private practice or even acting 
as a consultant to a major law firm, because of the premium that the 
prestige of being a former judge would attract.30 While inadequate 
pension entitlements are sometimes given as a reason for judges re-
tiring early and returning to private practice in Australia,31 on the 
High Court of Australia at least, the examples of judges having to 
linger in office because of inadequate funds or having to return to 
private practice to replenish their coffers all occurred long ago.32 An-
ecdotal evidence suggests that now, by the time they accept judicial 
appointment, most senior barristers in Australia have substantial 
sums invested in private pension plans and have accrued large num-
bers of assets, so they are not reliant on their judicial pensions to 
survive in retirement.  
B.   Promotion Prospects 
 Judges rarely, if ever, would admit that desire for promotion was 
a motivating factor.33 However, as Schauer notes in the U.S. context, 
while judges may be circumspect in admitting it, “it is hardly im-
plausible to suspect that many trial judges desire to become appel-
late judges, and that most judges of intermediate appellate courts 
(including the United States Courts of Appeals) desire to become 
                                                                                                                     
 28. Paul E. Greenberg & James A. Haley, The Role of the Compensation Structure in 
Enhancing Judicial Quality, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 417, 423-25 (1986). 
 29. Cass, supra note 13, at 970-71. 
 30. Macey, supra note 13, at 630 n.9. 
 31. P.W. Young, Judges’ Retirement, 71 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 733 (1997). 
 32. In the early years of the High Court of Australia, there is anecdotal evidence of 
judges remaining in office in the face of failing health for financial reasons. O’Conner 
(1903-1912) was unable to retire despite suffering from chronic illness from 1907 onward 
because he was pensionless; he eventually died in office. Griffith (1903-1919) suffered a 
stroke in 1917 and sat on few cases in his last two years on the Court, but he refused to re-
tire because he had insufficient funds; he eventually retired when the government passed 
legislation granting him a pension.  
 33. Schauer, supra note 13, at 623. 
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judges of courts of last resort.”34 There is some evidence that judges 
in Japan and the United States are motivated by prospects of promo-
tion. Cohen presents empirical evidence that desire for promotion in-
fluences the behavior of district judges in the United States.35 Taha 
shows that judges with higher prospects of promotion are more likely 
to publish their opinions.36 In a series of articles, Ramseyer and 
Rasmusen find that promotion prospects influence the behavior of 
lower court judges in Japan.37  
 Desire to be promoted is also likely to be a motivating factor in 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Both nations have career-
based judiciaries, with most judges of the English House of Lords be-
ing promoted from the English Court of Appeal and most judges of 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal coming from the New Zealand 
High Court. It is interesting to note that, in the case of both New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, existing studies suggest that gov-
ernments take into account both political factors (independence exer-
cised by the judge) and indicators of the quality of judicial decision-
making (such as the proportion of cases in which the judge has been 
reversed) in deciding whether and when the judge should be pro-
moted.38  
 In Australia, promotion is less likely to be a motivating factor be-
cause the prospects of promotion are fewer, at least to the High 
Court of Australia. There have been only forty-four members of the 
High Court, including the current justices; and they have been ap-
pointed from a variety of places, including lower judicial office, poli-
tics, and private practice. Less than half (twenty-one) have held prior 
judicial office. Of those who have held prior judicial office, most (sev-
enteen) have been appointed from state supreme courts, primarily 
from either Victoria or New South Wales, with the others being pro-
                                                                                                                     
 34. Id. at 631-32. 
 35. Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What’s “Unconstitutional” About 
the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 192-95 (1991) [hereinafter Cohen, 
Explaining Judicial Behavior]; Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence 
from Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 13, 17-27 (1992).  
 36. Ahmed E. Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 21-23 (2004).  
 37. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Re-
gime: The Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997); J. Mark Ramseyer and 
Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged 
Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (2001); J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is 
the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2001). 
 38. For a study of the determinants of promotion from the New Zealand High Court to 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal, see Pushkar Maitra & Russell Smyth, Judicial Inde-
pendence, Judicial Promotion and the Enforcement of Legislative Wealth Transfers—An 
Empirical Study of the New Zealand High Court, 17 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 209 (2004). For a 
study of the determinants of promotion from the English Court of Appeal to the House of 
Lords, see Eli Salzberger & Paul Fenn, Judicial Independence: Some Evidence from the 
English Court of Appeal, 42 J.L. & ECON. 831 (1999). 
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moted from the Federal Court. Because there is a large pool of poten-
tial candidates across all the state supreme courts—at least com-
pared with the smaller, more concentrated pools of candidates for ju-
dicial promotion in New Zealand and the United Kingdom—a judge’s 
probability of being promoted to the High Court of Australia is very 
low. 
C.   Respect of Colleagues 
 There is a large law and economics literature that suggests that 
reputation among one’s peers is a powerful nonpecuniary motivating 
factor for many people.39 In this respect, judges are likely to be the 
same as everyone else, although there is room to debate how wide a 
judge’s reference group will be. Miceli and Coşgel suggest that “how a 
judge is viewed by his or her colleagues, by law professors, law stu-
dents, and the general public” is a motivating factor to perform 
well.40 In Australia and New Zealand, where judges are less visible to 
the public than Justices of the United States Supreme Court, few 
members of the general public would know of any members of even 
the highest courts, so public esteem is unlikely to be a motivating 
factor. For judges of the High Court of Australia and the New Zea-
land Court of Appeal, whose opinions appear in casebooks and are 
debated in journal articles, they may well care how their output is 
viewed by legal academics and law students. In Australia, this might 
also be true for judges of state supreme courts, who are fairly visible 
to legal academics, at least those located in the same state.  
 For most “run of the mill” judges of lower courts, whose opinions 
are rarely discussed in law lectures or extracted in casebooks, respect 
of the academic community is unlikely to be a major motivating fac-
tor. These judges are likely to have a more narrow reference group, 
which is restricted to their colleagues in the same court and the law-
yers who appear before them. The breadth of the reference group is 
important when thinking about what motivates judges. For a lower 
court judge, the main indicator of judicial performance might be how 
well he or she manages his or her caseload, and esteem among the 
relevant reference group will be given or withheld on this basis.41 The 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995); Eric A. Posner, Sym-
bols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998); 
Schauer, supra note 13, at 633.  
 40. Miceli & Coşgel, supra note 19, at 32; see also Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of 
Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107, 129 (1983) (arguing that judges seek pres-
tige among the lawyers and litigants who bring cases before them); Posner, supra note 12, 
at 13 (arguing that judges care about how they are viewed by lawyers, but not litigants, 
who appear before them). 
 41. See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 910-11 (2002); 
Schauer, supra note 13, at 633. 
2005]                       AN ANTIPODEAN PERSPECTIVE 1307 
 
art of writing good opinions, which are cited frequently or published 
in casebooks or legal commentary, is likely to be less important for 
these judges. Schauer even suggests that if lower court judges spend 
too much time writing opinions (or worse still journal articles), then 
this will have a negative effect on how their colleagues perceive 
them—they will be branded as too ambitious for spending too much 
time on self-advertising or as free riders because time spent on writ-
ing elaborate opinions detracts from time that could be spent on mov-
ing the docket along.42 In contrast, judges of higher (appellate) 
courts, while also seeking the respect of their colleagues on the bench 
and practicing profession, have more opportunities to be cited in 
other opinions and in academic references. These judges will have 
greater incentive to spend more time writing better opinions.  
D.   Influence 
 Posner argues that other factors motivating judges are the power 
to influence outcomes through voting and the evolution of the law 
through creating precedent.43 Landes and Posner posit that judges 
derive utility from imposing their policy preferences on the commu-
nity.44 Schauer suggests that “judges could plausibly select outcomes, 
or select substantive or methodological ‘trademarks,’ for the purpose 
of maximizing their own influence.”45 In this respect, the time final 
appellate court judges spend on writing opinions to increase influ-
ence might be a function of the state of the law. It might be argued 
that, generally, the evolution of the law follows a steady-state growth 
path. There will be periods, however, when the law is in a state of 
historical flux. This was the case, for instance, in the High Court of 
Australia in the 1990s, which is often attributed to the activist legacy 
of the Mason Court (1987-1995). One commentator on the High Court 
in the 1990s noted that the law is contestably “more evident and ac-
cepted than ever” and that “there are seen to be many more legiti-
mate approaches to argumentation than ever before.”46  
 There are analogies between the argument being made here and 
the external environment facing the firm. In the steady-state growth 
path, the firm will be operating in a technologically stable environ-
ment. In most circumstances, decisions will be routine, repetitive, 
and follow well-defined patterns; opportunities for technological 
breakthrough and, consequently, for making sizeable economic rents 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Schauer, supra note 13, at 633. 
 43. Posner, supra note 12, at 15-23. 
 44. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Em-
pirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 274-75 (1976). 
 45. Schauer, supra note 13, at 633. 
 46. Graeme Orr, Verbosity and Richness: Current Trends in the Craft of the High 
Court, 6 TORTS L.J. 291, 292 (1998). 
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will be relatively small. In contrast, in periods of flux, there are more 
opportunities for endogenous innovation—which suggest several pos-
sible multiple trajectories where focus is on the creative, rather than 
allocative, functions of the market—and there is potential for high 
returns in a high-risk environment.47 In these periods of instability in 
the evolution of the common law’s long-run growth path, as occurred 
in Australia in the 1990s, there is greater potential for judges to earn 
economic rents in the form of influence over the evolution of prece-
dent. In these circumstances, one would expect the judge, as homo 
economicus, to write longer and more complex opinions in an attempt 
to win the battle of ideas. This is what happened in the High Court 
in the 1990s; there was a sizeable increase in the number and length 
of concurring opinions.48 Leaving a legacy in the form of a body of 
precedent could be an important motivating factor for many final ap-
pellate judges to write complex and lengthy opinions. This is more 
pressing in Australia and New Zealand relative to most jurisdictions 
in the United States, because in Australia and New Zealand judges 
face mandatory retirement ages.  
 The objective of Choi and Gulati’s tournament is to identify high-
fliers for promotion.49 While the highfliers might have a relatively 
low marginal time preference for leisure, there is considerable evi-
dence that “run of the mill” judges attempt to minimize workloads. 
This is most true of lower courts. Cohen shows that the district 
judges in the United States behave so as to minimize workloads.50 
Taha finds that district judges with lighter workloads have more 
time to publish their decisions.51 However, it is also the case for some 
judges on appellate courts. Clearly, not all judges are motivated by 
the prospect of leaving a legacy. Throughout the history of the United 
States Supreme Court, there have been Justices who appear to have 
had a preference for minimizing their workload by writing few opin-
ions and free riding on the efforts of others.52 This is also the case for 
the High Court of Australia, with some Justices well known for hav-
                                                                                                                     
 47. See NEIL M. KAY, THE EVOLVING FIRM: STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE IN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 58-61 (1982); Nicholas Kaldor, The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics, 
82 ECON. J. 1237, 1244-46 (1972). 
 48. For jurimetric evidence on opinion-writing trends over the history of the High 
Court of Australia, which documents an increase in the length of opinions and number of 
concurring opinions in the 1990s, see Matthew Groves & Russell Smyth, A Century of Ju-
dicial Style: Changing Patterns in Judgment Writing on the High Court 1903-2001, 32 FED. 
L. REV. 255 (2004). 
 49. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: 
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 29-30 (2004). 
 50. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra note 35, at 193. 
 51. Taha, supra note 36, at 20. 
 52. See David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 466 passim (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant Justice: Fur-
ther Evidence, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 492-96 (1983). 
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ing a proclivity for joining in joint opinions or writing short concur-
ring opinions. 
IV.   HOW SHOULD WE MEASURE AND RANK JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE? 
A.   Opinions Published 
 In their proposed tournament of judges, Choi and Gulati treat the 
number of published opinions as an important indicator of judicial 
productivity.53 The rationale is that 
it takes greater effort and skill to write more published opinions. 
Measuring effort exerted by a judge is an important element of the 
tournament because comparing the past effort levels of the various 
judges (a) helps predict future effort levels (we want Justices who 
will exert high levels of effort) and (b) helps determine who among 
the lower court judges should be rewarded for their efforts . . . .54 
On the face of it, this reasoning is sound in the United States con-
text. There is much evidence that writing published opinions involves 
expending more effort than writing unpublished opinions. In their 
analysis of published and unpublished opinions by the United States 
courts of appeals, Reynolds and Richman conclude that “anyone who 
reads even a small number of unpublished opinions must conclude, 
given their brevity and informality, that considerable effort has been 
spared in their preparation.”55 This reasoning, however, does not ex-
tend to Australian and New Zealand courts, which follow the English 
practice of seriatim opinion writing and use a different reporting sys-
tem.  
 In Australia and New Zealand, there is no single signed opinion of 
the court where the author is readily identifiable. Instead, each judge 
writes his or her own opinion. Sometimes two or more judges, or 
more rarely the whole court, give a joint opinion, but who actually 
wrote the opinion in such situations is not disclosed. Those who en-
dorse the opinion are listed in order of seniority at the beginning. 
The actual opinion might have been written by one or more of the 
judges who “sign on.” Attempts to measure judicial output over time 
are further complicated by changing opinion-writing practices over 
time. For example, on the High Court of Australia, particularly in its 
early years, it was common for Justice X to write a short concurring 
opinion of the form “I agree” with Justice Y, while at other points in 
time, Justices X and Y would write a joint opinion.56 In the former 
                                                                                                                     
 53. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 49, at 42-47. 
 54. Id. at 42 (footnote omitted). 
 55. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publica-
tion in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 
594-95 (1981). 
 56. Groves & Smyth, supra note 48, at 267. 
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case, the contributions of Justices X and Y are separable products, 
but in the latter case, it is impossible to know who wrote the opinion.  
 The system of law-reporting is different in Australia and New 
Zealand in the sense that in the past, the decision to publish a case 
was based on its perceived precedent value, rather than the inherent 
reasoning of the judge(s). Because only a small proportion of deci-
sions were reported in the official and unofficial law reports, pub-
lished opinions were not a good indicator of effort. In Australia and 
New Zealand, unpublished opinions have precedent value in the 
same way as published opinions. Before the widespread use of the 
Internet, relatively few unpublished opinions were cited because of 
the difficulty of locating them. However, since the development of the 
Internet, unpublished decisions are readily available on the Web, 
free of charge, for a range of courts, and these are widely cited as if 
they were in the law reports.57 Indeed, publishing lags, coupled with 
high purchase costs, are increasingly making law reports redundant. 
At least at the appellate level, there is no difference in effort needed 
to produce published opinions that appear in the law reports and un-
published opinions that are available on the Internet. 
 The practice of seriatim opinion writing, where the author of joint 
opinions is not disclosed, raises the well-known free-rider problem 
with team production. The problem with team production, as Alchian 
and Demsetz note, is that the individual marginal products of team 
members cannot be verified.58 The implication is that determining 
who shirks and by how much is not possible with such a joint prod-
uct. This comes back to the motivations of judges discussed above. 
The “run of the mill” judges will have an incentive to shirk by par-
ticipating in joint opinions to minimize their workload in the absence 
of effective monitoring.59 This will be particularly true in the face of 
increasing workloads. There are instances throughout the history of 
the High Court of Australia where this is apparent. For example, 
even casual inspection of the Commonwealth Law Reports suggests 
that Rich (1913-1950) and McTiernan (1930-1976), the two longest-
serving members of the High Court of Australia, frequently free rode 
on the work ethic and intellect of Dixon (1929-1964), who is Austra-
lia’s most celebrated judge, by participating in joint opinions or writ-
                                                                                                                     
 57. Decisions of a number of Australian courts, including the High Court of Australia, 
are available free of charge on the AustLII databases. AustLII Databases, Australian Legal 
Information Institute, http://www.austlii.edu.au/databases.html (last updated Apr. 7, 
2005). 
 58. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972). 
 59. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 123-26 (1995). 
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ing short concurring opinions.60 Starke (1920-1950), who was a con-
temporary of all three judges on the Court, caricatured McTiernan as 
a “parrot” who always copied Dixon.61 While this characterization 
was motivated by personal differences, it is supported by studies of 
voting behavior, which show that McTiernan exhibited a high level of 
agreement with Dixon.62 Diaries that Dixon kept provide some in-
sights into the free-riding problem:  
Numerous entries show [Dixon] regularly helping Rich with his 
judgments (even when Dixon had not sat on the case), and occa-
sionally he helped McTiernan with his. Later entries state that he 
wrote some of Rich’s judgments for him, though it is possible that 
Dixon meant he was writing sections of Rich’s judgments.63  
Under these circumstances, it will be difficult to detect the true level 
of effort judges expend using opinions as a measure of performance. 
The only real monitoring device will be norms on the court as to 
whether a judge’s contribution to the workload of the court is accept-
able, and this is difficult for those outside the court to effectively ob-
serve, let alone quantify in a meaningful manner.  
 One approach to detecting effort levels, which distinguishes be-
tween full written opinions and short concurring opinions, would be 
to examine the length of the opinion. The argument is that longer 
opinions address the relevant issues more fully and require more ef-
fort. Such a measure attempts to tap into the motives of judges. 
Judges who want to leave their mark on the law will write longer 
opinions. Currie uses “pages per year” in constitutional cases to ex-
plore the question of who is the most insignificant Justice in the his-
tory of the United States Supreme Court.64 In their study of the de-
terminants of promotion from the English Court of Appeal to the 
House of Lords, Salzberger and Fenn attempt to confront the free-
rider issue by giving short concurring opinions a lower weighting.65  
 There are, however, problems with focusing on the length of opin-
ion. One problem is that it gives a biased indicator of effort expended 
over time. As discussed earlier, if judges behave as homo economicus, 
opinions will be longer when there are more opportunities to leave a 
legacy, which will occur at points in time when the evolution of the 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Russell Smyth, Judicial Interaction on the Latham Court: A Quantitative Study of 
Voting Patterns on the High Court 1935-1950, 47 AUSTRALIAN J. POL. & HIST. 330, 340-42 
(2001).  
 61. See Clem Lloyd, Not Peace But a Sword!—The High Court Under J.G. Latham, 11 
ADEL. L. REV. 175, 181 (1987). 
 62. See Russell Smyth, Explaining Voting Patterns on the Latham High Court 1935-
50, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 88, 100 tbl.1 & tbl.2 (2002); Smyth, supra note 60, at 338-40. 
 63. Philip Ayres, Dixon Diaries, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE HIGH COURT OF 
AUSTRALIA 222, 223 (Tony Blackshield et al. eds., 2001). 
 64. Currie, supra note 52, at 469. 
 65. Salzberger & Fenn, supra note 38, at 837. 
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law is not on its long-run growth path. Measures such as “pages per 
year” have to be examined relative to opportunities and in the con-
text of changing norms governing opinion writing over time.66 An-
other problem is that, even when examining performance at a given 
point in time, there is an argument that verbosity should not be re-
warded.67 The increase in the length of opinions on the High Court of 
Australia in the 1990s, interspersed with increasing numbers of 
footnotes and citations to academic references, is a trend which has 
been criticized rather than applauded in some quarters.68 It has been 
criticized for increasing the cost to the “consumers” of the opinion, 
who are defined as those who need to take time to read and digest 
the implications of the opinion.69 
 Another problem in counting opinions, particularly in the Austra-
lian and New Zealand context where there is no effective distinction 
between published and unpublished opinions, is that there is no 
product differentiation between publishing outlets—that is, there are 
no “first-tier,” “second-tier,” and “third-tier” law reports. Studies that 
attempt to measure the productivity of academic departments or in-
dividual academics by counting publications will invariably use some 
sort of quality-adjusted output measure, so that a publication in a 
first-tier journal will count for more than a publication in a third-tier 
journal. An interesting feature of publishing judicial opinions is that 
at the time of publication, there is either no or little peer assessment 
of quality. This, of course, is also true of student-edited law reviews 
in the United States, although there are first-tier, second-tier, and 
third-tier law reviews; and through the multiple submission process, 
it is arguable that a manuscript will end up at about its right level.70 
In a Coaseian world, free of transaction costs, one solution might be 
to have a series of electronic law reports (tier one, tier two, tier three, 
tier four, and rejected) similar to the Berkeley Electronic Press’s 
“families” of journals.71 In practice, though, the transaction costs in-
                                                                                                                     
 66. See Easterbrook, supra note 52, at 491-92 (arguing that “pages per year” has to be 
examined relative to opportunities and viewed along with other indicators as a measure of 
judicial performance). 
 67. Cf. Brian Leiter, Measuring the Academic Distinction of Law Faculties, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 451, 467-68 (2000) (arguing that productivity is an important measure for de-
termining the academic distinction of law faculties but that there must be quality checks 
in place to avoid giving credit for “junk”). 
 68. E.g., Enid Campbell, Reasons for Judgment: Some Consumer Perspectives, 77 
AUSTRALIAN L.J. 62, 63 (2003). 
 69. Id. at 64. 
 70. Note that this differs from Australia, where student-edited law reviews are peer 
reviewed. 
 71. See Berkeley Electronic Press, at http://www.bepress.com/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2005). For more information about the quality-rating system, among other things, 
utilized by the Berkeley Electronic Press, see bepress: A Revolution in Scholarly Publish-
ing, Berkeley Electronic Press, at http://www.bepress.com/revolution.html#qr (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2005).  
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volved in such a proposal would be high, and it would be complicated 
by the perceived precedent value of the decision, which may have 
nothing to do with the effort expended or quality of the writing. 
There is peer assessment of opinion quality at the time of consump-
tion—if the consumer does not think the publication is worthwhile, it 
will not be cited. However, this raises the issue of how to determine 
quality. When citing journals, academics can use the ranking of the 
journal as a signalling device of quality because highly cited journals 
tend to be highly read journals. No such signalling device exists for 
judges. Typically consumers will base their decision on the reputa-
tion capital of the individual judge or, perhaps, the circuit.  
B.   Citations 
 Choi and Gulati suggest that citations to published opinions are a 
market test for the quality of opinions.72 Adjusted citation counts to 
judicial opinions have been widely used in recent years to measure 
what has variously been described as a judge’s influence, prestige, or 
reputation.73 These studies generally emphasize that citations are at 
best a rough proxy for quality, although in the subsequent empirical 
implementation of their tournament, Choi and Gulati treat citation 
counts as a measure of the quality of the judicial opinion.74 Citations 
have also been used in studies of the relationship between aging and 
judicial productivity, that is, as a measure of the quality of judicial 
output as a judge gets older.75 Some have criticized the use of citation 
counts as a measure of quality, focusing on the limitations of their 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 305-06.  
 73. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 74-91 (1990); Mita 
Bhattacharya & Russell Smyth, The Determinants of Judicial Prestige and Influence: Some 
Empirical Evidence from the High Court of Australia, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (2001) [her-
inafter Bhattacharya & Smyth, Judicial Prestige and the High Court]; David Klein & 
Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1999); Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of 
Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1998); William M. Landes et al., Judicial 
Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 
(1998); Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial 
Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 534-40 (1994) (book review); Russell Smyth & Mita Bhatta-
charya, What Determines Judicial Prestige? An Empirical Analysis for Judges of the Fed-
eral Court of Australia, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 233 (2003) [hereinafter Smyth & Bhatta-
charya, Judicial Prestige and the Federal Court]. 
 74. Choi & Gulati, supra note 49, at 48-61. 
 75. See Mita Bhattacharya & Russell Smyth, Aging and Productivity Among Judges: 
Some Empirical Evidence from the High Court of Australia, 40 AUSTRALIAN ECON. PAPERS 
199 (2001) [hereinafter Bhattacharya & Smyth, Aging and Productivity and the High 
Court]; Russell Smyth & Mita Bhattacharya, How Fast Do Old Judges Slow Down? A Life 
Cycle Study of Aging and Productivity in the Federal Court of Australia, 23 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 141 (2003) [hereinafter Smyth & Bhattacharya, Aging and Productivity and the 
Federal Court]. 
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use.76 One such limitation is evidence of like-minded citations where 
“conservative” or “liberal” judges tend to cite members of their re-
spective group to the exclusion of the other camp.77 This is problem-
atic where the court is dominated by appointments on one side of the 
political fence. This has traditionally been the case in Australia and 
New Zealand, where most appointments to the High Court of Austra-
lia and New Zealand Court of Appeal have been made by the “con-
servative” side of politics. The problem in Australia, at least, has 
been exacerbated by the unorthodox approach to opinion writing by 
some Labor appointments, which have been shunned by their more 
“conservative” colleagues. While this issue and problems with cita-
tion counts are well known, it is generally recognized in a wide range 
of disciplines that in spite of these limitations, there is a correlation 
between citations received and the quality of output.78 
 One problem with using citation counts to judicial opinions in the 
United States is the problem of ghostwriting, where it is the law clerk, 
rather than the judge, who writes the opinion.79 As Landes, Lessig, 
and Solimine note, “[c]itations may reflect the influence or quality of 
law clerks as ‘ghost writers’ rather than that of judges . . . .”80 How-
ever, as Choi and Gulati argue, the problem is tempered because 
judges who rely heavily on clerks will produce opinions of more vary-
ing quality, because it will be difficult even for a high-quality judge 
to consistently retain high-quality clerks.81 Moreover, even with 
judges who rely heavily on law clerks, citations might still reflect 
performance as a manager.82 The reasoning is that there will be a 
signalling device where the best clerks (who write the best opinions 
and get cited the most) will be attracted to the best judges, although 
the market for clerks is imperfect.83 The issue of ghostwriting does 
not impede using citation counts in Australia. The limited anecdotal 
evidence that exists from both judges84 and former clerks85 suggests 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Arthur Austin, The Reliability of Citation Counts in Judgments on Promotion, 
Tenure, and Status, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 829 (1993). For counterarguments in the context of 
counting citations to judicial opinions, see Landes et al., supra note 73, at 271-76; Richard 
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
381 (2000). 
 77. Austin, supra note 76, at 833-34.  
 78. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 49, at 48 n.38 (citing a multitude of studies “that ei-
ther suggest or assume a relationship between citation counts and quality”). 
 79. Nadine J. Wichern, Comment, A Court of Clerks, Not of Men: Serving Justice in 
the Media Age, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 621, 649-50 (1999). 
 80. Landes et al., supra note 73, at 274. 
 81. Choi & Gulati, supra note 49, at 52. 
 82. Cass, supra note 13, at 989-91. 
 83. Epstein, supra note 11, at 841-44. 
 84. Michael Kirby, What Is It Really Like to Be a Justice of the High Court of Austra-
lia? A Conversation Between Law Students and Justice Kirby, 19 SYDNEY L. REV. 514, 519-
20 (1997); P.W. Young, Judgment Writing, 70 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 513, 513-16 (1996). 
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that judges write their own opinions in Australia. There is, however, 
another practical problem with using citations to measure the qual-
ity of judicial opinions in Australia and New Zealand. This stems 
from the earlier observation that there is no signed opinion of the 
court. Thus, when a case is cited, it is impossible in most instances to 
attribute authorship. Therefore, existing studies of judicial influence 
and productivity for Australian courts have relied on invocation 
rates.86 Choi and Gulati suggest that invocation rates are more an 
indication of reputation, while citation counts are a measure of qual-
ity.87 It can be argued that invocation rates are preferable to citation 
counts as a measure of the influence of the opinion on the citing 
judge’s thinking, even in the United States, because there is no re-
quirement that the citing judge go the extra step and refer to the au-
thor of the cited opinion by name.88 
C.   Reversals 
 Posner suggests that while judges do not like to be reversed, aver-
sion to reversal does not figure prominently in the judicial utility 
function. He reasons that most reversals reflect differences in judi-
cial philosophy or legal policy, rather than error by the judge below.89 
However, while some reversals will undoubtedly reflect policy issues, 
it is reasonable to assume that a judge gets disutility when his or her 
decision is reversed by judges who are in higher courts or by future 
judges.90 Elsewhere Posner accepts that since judges might seek to be 
promoted, they may display extreme “sensitivity to being reversed.”91 
Cass agrees: “Judicial reversal reflects professional criticism by other 
professionals. It will likely be a negative for almost all judges in al-
most all circumstances.”92 For this reason, judges will expend effort 
on ensuring that their opinions are well-reasoned to reduce the oc-
currence of reversal. The proportion of cases in which a judge has 
been reversed is something that is readily quantifiable as one com-
ponent of a tournament of judges.  
                                                                                                                     
 85. Andrew Leigh, Behind the Bench: Associates in the High Court of Australia, 25 
ALTERNATIVE L.J. 295, 296-97 (2000). 
 86. Bhattacharya & Smyth, Aging and Productivity and the High Court, supra note 
75, at 203; Bhattacharya & Smyth, Judicial Prestige and the High Court, supra note 73, at 
233-34; Smyth & Bhattacharya, Aging and Productivity and the Federal Court, supra note 
75, at 149-50; Smyth & Bhattacharya, Judicial Prestige and the Federal Court, supra note 
73, at 238-39. 
 87. Choi & Gulati, supra note 49, at 58-59. 
 88. Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 73, at 375-76. 
 89. Posner, supra note 12, at 14-15. 
 90. Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices’ Decision Mak-
ing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 723 n.8 (2000). 
 91. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.6, at 543 (6th ed. 2003). 
 92. Cass, supra note 13, at 984. 
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 Previous studies for a range of courts both inside and outside the 
United States have used reversals as a measure of judicial perform-
ance.93 Posner uses reversals by the Supreme Court to assess the 
quality of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
relative to other circuits.94 Reversals have also been employed in 
studies of the English Court of Appeal and the New Zealand High 
Court as an indicator of the quality of decisionmaking.95 While 
Maitra and Smyth found that reversals had a statistically insignifi-
cant effect on promotion prospects of judges on the New Zealand 
High Court,96 Salzberger and Fenn found that those judges on the 
English Court of Appeal who had a higher proportion of their deci-
sions reversed by the House of Lords were less likely to be pro-
moted.97 
D.   Judicial Gowns or Academic Robes? 
 Judges’ contributions to academic scholarship in the form of law 
review articles has been described as a form of judicial leadership.98 
If so, it is arguable that extrajudicial contributions such as academic 
writing should be a part of the tournament. Currently, if anything, 
judges in the United States vying for appointment to the Supreme 
Court have a disincentive to publish in law reviews, because it con-
tributes to a Bork-like paper trail of their views. There is empirical 
support for this view. Gaille examined the academic publication pat-
terns of judges on the United States courts of appeals prior and sub-
sequent to the Bork confirmation hearings and found that judges 
published less in academic journals after the hearings.99 
 The main argument supporting the view that academic publica-
tions should be viewed favorably is that there are complementarities 
between good judging and good writing abilities reflected in law re-
view articles. Thus judges who are novel thinkers are more likely to 
publish in law reviews, and this proclivity is correlated with citations 
received.100 On the United States courts of appeals, academics turned 
judges, such as Easterbrook and Posner, are cases in point.101 How-
                                                                                                                     
 93. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of 
Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711 passim (2000).  
 94. Id. 
 95. E.g., Maitra & Smyth, supra note 38, at 221; Salzberger & Fenn, supra note 38, at 
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 96. Maitra & Smyth, supra note 38, at 226-27.  
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 100. Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 73, at 383. 
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ever, in these cases, it is their citation counts, rather than scholarly 
publication records, that make them good judicial performers.102 
There is an alternative argument that outsiders on the court are 
more likely to publish in law reviews because their views are not 
gaining acceptance on the court.103 There is casual evidence to sup-
port this on the current High Court of Australia: Justice Kirby has 
the highest dissent rate in the history of the Court and is also the 
most prolific publisher in law reviews, publishing three times more 
than any other Justice.104 If judges behave as homo economicus, then 
including outside activities, such as writing journal articles, in the 
tournament of judges also potentially creates perverse incentives. As 
Choi and Gulati note, “Giving a judge credit for doing other things 
will diminish the incentive to spend time on opinion writing.”105 
V.   IS IT APPROPRIATE TO MEASURE AND RANK JUDICIAL 
PERFORMANCE? 
 Choi and Gulati’s whole rationale for a tournament of judges 
premised on objective quantitative indicators is that it would make 
the judicial appointment process more transparent and less politi-
cized.106 Some, however, have expressed reservations about the ex-
tent to which judicial performance can be quantified. The outcome of 
a tournament of judges has to be viewed subject to these reserva-
tions, which fall into two main categories. The first concerns the mer-
its of applying empirical techniques to the study of judicial behavior 
because of inherent data problems. The second is that quantitative 
studies cannot capture important qualitative dimensions associated 
with good judging, and in particular, quantitative studies are unable 
to measure the positive effects of collegiality. In this Part I, provide a 
brief review of these concerns. 
 The law and economics movement, together with allied research-
ers in political science, has been at the forefront of explaining judicial 
behavior using quantitative tools. One argument against the expan-
sion of economics beyond its traditional domain of markets is that 
the data is too thin to reliably test hypotheses formulated in the so-
cial sciences.107 While markets generate a range of data on variables 
                                                                                                                     
 102. Id. at 68 tbl.11.  
 103. Peter McCormick, Judges, Journals and Exegesis: Judicial Leadership and Aca-
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of interest—such as output, prices, and employment—many studies 
of courts and judges are restricted to a universe of published, written 
decisions. The focus on such decisions, along with an emphasis on 
appellate courts, reflects greater data availability, reduces the extent 
to which findings can be generalized, and raises the prospect of selec-
tion bias.108 In some studies of judicial behavior, sample size has been 
problematic, with far-reaching conclusions drawn on the basis of a 
small number of observations.  
 In studies of judicial decisionmaking, there are also problems with 
comparability and experimental design.109 Prior to the 1980s, most 
empirical work on judicial decisionmaking used discrete datasets 
bearing on a limited set of research issues, which made it difficult to 
compare and replicate results because different studies often made 
different assumptions or collected data on variables in different 
ways, or both. Longitudinal studies, employing time series data over 
time, have often had to make the heroic assumption that cases from 
different eras are sufficiently similar that the results are comparable 
and generalizable. One approach to addressing the limitations on the 
assumption of comparability has been to explore alternative research 
designs such as experimental methods.110 The problem, though, with 
experimental studies that employ simulated cases to gauge judicial 
performance is the associated loss of authenticity.111 
 Having said this, empirical researchers aware of the limitations 
have recently made considerable progress dealing with many of these 
data issues. One development has been a trend in the United States 
toward the use of datasets containing both published and unpub-
lished decisions in recognition of the biases introduced with only us-
ing published decisions. A second occurrence in the United States 
has been the emergence of multiuser datasets designed for use in a 
range of research problems.112 These datasets are not restricted to 
the Supreme Court but have also been developed for the courts of ap-
peals and state supreme courts.113 A third development, which is par-
ticularly apt in the context of this Essay’s Antipodean focus, is that 
studies looking at different aspects of judicial performance are start-
ing to emerge for courts outside the United States. It has to be said, 
                                                                                                                     
 108. Heise, supra note 13, at 843-44; R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Fed-
eral Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1105, 1128-29 (2004). 
 109. The rest of this paragraph draws on Heise, supra note 13, at 845-48. 
 110. See, e.g., Peter J. van Koppen & Jan ten Kate, Individual Differences in Judicial 
Behavior: Personal Characteristics and Private Law Decision-Making, 18 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 225 (1984) (administering psychological tests to Dutch judges participating in a court 
simulation). 
 111. Heise, supra note 13, at 846.  
 112. Id. at 830.  
 113. See id. at 848-49. 
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though, that progress on this front has been patchy. Atkins’ observa-
tions, made at the beginning of the 1990s, are still true now: “Despite 
much progress during the past few decades in the study of courts and 
judicial behavior, most theory and data developed by social scientists 
for understanding legal systems still remain very much the product 
of, and thus bound to, the inevitable peculiarities of the U.S. con-
text.”114 Atkins goes on to suggest, “This must represent a curious in-
consistency in the logic of our research agenda, since the scientific 
method to which we adhere is supposed to encourage theory building 
and description at the broadest level possible.”115 These comments 
underpin the need, emphasized in the previous Part, to be flexible in 
the design of a tournament of judges intended to measure judicial 
performance and to cater to different institutional contexts. 
 Another objection to attempting to quantify judicial performance 
is the argument that quantitative tools are not apposite to capture 
the multifaceted aspects of being a good judge. Hensler, for instance, 
argues, “Researchers simply do not have available very good quanti-
tative approaches to studying large social organizations [such as 
courts] or interaction processes [within courts].”116 The argument is 
that there are important qualitative aspects to being a good judge 
which are difficult to quantify in a tournament. In addition to dili-
gence and ability, which can be measured using opinion and citation 
counts, other generally agreed useful qualities include integrity, 
fairness, temperament, and collegiality.117 Judge Edwards has been 
one of the strongest critics of attempts to quantify judicial perform-
ance on the basis that collegiality cannot be measured: 
Collegiality is a qualitative variable in appellate decision making, 
because it involves mostly private personal interactions that are 
not readily susceptible to empirical study. Regression analysis 
does not do well in capturing the nuances of human personalities 
and relationships, so empirical studies on judicial decision making 
that rely solely on this tool are inherently flawed.118 
Some of these desirable qualities, though, have been captured in sur-
veys such as that of the American Bar Association.119 Moreover, con-
trary to what the quote from Judge Edwards implies, there is much 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Burton M. Atkins, Party Capability Theory as an Explanation for Intervention Be-
havior in the English Court of Appeal, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 881, 881 (1991). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Deborah R. Hensler, Researching Civil Justice: Problems and Pitfalls, 51 LAW & 
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 117. See Susanne Di Pietro et al., Judicial Qualifications and Judicial Performance: Is 
There a Relationship?, 83 JUDICATURE 196, 197-98 (2000).  
 118. Edwards, supra note 14, at 1656 (footnote omitted); see also Harry T. Edwards, 
Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998). 
 119. Laura E. Little, The ABA’s Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: Are 
We Ready to Give Up on the Lawyers?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 41 (2001). 
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evidence of the success of regression analysis in capturing these nu-
ances of human behavior. For instance, there have been hundreds of 
published articles in which regression has been used to analyze 
scores from personality inventories, such as the Minnesota Multi-
phasic Personality Inventory, the 16PF, and the Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator, where regression analysis has been used precisely for this 
purpose.120 
 Having said this, Edwards’ concerns have important implications 
for how the efficiency aspects of measuring judicial performance are 
interpreted. The Alchian and Demsetz team production model, with 
its emphasis on monitoring the individual, is concerned with alloca-
tive efficiency.121 In the Alchian and Demsetz model, the firm and the 
market are opposite sides of the same coin.122 In the context of this 
discussion, “the firm” can be interpreted as the court. In the Alchian 
and Demsetz conception, there is no role for the court as a social or-
ganization. The efficiency gains stem from specialization and the de-
tailed division of labor. But the emphasis Judge Edwards and others 
place on the importance of collegiality in the court suggests that in 
the court’s team production, there are potential benefits from organ-
izational learning. These stem from continual interaction between 
members of the court that cannot be captured with a more narrow fo-
cus on allocative efficiency. There are positive externalities in team 
production from collegiality that are manifest in the form of collective 
learning on the court. The relevant efficiency criteria is productive ef-
ficiency rather than allocative efficiency, and the efficiency gains ac-
crue from economies of scope rather than economies of scale.123 Ed-
wards’ concerns suggest that attempts to measure judicial perform-
ance using similar tournament designs to Choi and Gulati’s focus 
heavily on the allocative-efficiency dimension. The productive-
efficiency dimension tends to be downplayed. Thus, it is important to 
recognize that the hardheaded figures which come out of a tourna-
ment based on citation counts, while insightful, tell only part of the 
story.  
 A different issue is whether the acceptance of broader aspects of 
human behavior—such as collegiality, integrity, and fairness as de-
sirable attributes in a judge—is commensurate with a conceptualiza-
tion of the one-dimensional homo economicus. One might argue that 
                                                                                                                     
 120. For a meta-analysis, see James M. Schuerger et al., Factors That Influence the 
Temporal Stability of Personality by Questionnaire, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
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 121. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 58, at 779-81.  
 122. Id. at 793-94.  
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the model on which he is conceived is at best myopic and at worst 
incommensurable with regard to the component of perceived moral 
obligation that arguably influences much of human social behavior, 
including behavioral intentions and, importantly, attitudes.124 If this 
is the case, “Justice Homo Economicus” might be a distorted lens 
through which to view judicial behavior. Instead, perhaps we should 
be asking what motivates “Justice Homo Sociologicus,” the (irra-
tional?) mirror image of economic man. The teleological underpin-
nings of the two judges differ in that homo economicus has essen-
tially an ego-goal orientation, whereas homo sociologicus is a role 
player acting under the instructions of his environment. While homo 
economicus is assumed to be motivated by self-interest, homo soci-
ologicus is conceived in the constructivist tradition, which acknowl-
edges that all actors are resident within some social context. The so-
cial context, or more precisely the social norms that emerge from 
within the social context (including norms governing judges’ interac-
tion on the court), influence behavior and, important in the context of 
measuring judicial performance, the pursuit of goals. This is because 
they impose upon judges social roles, inherent in which are prescrip-
tions about behavior, group interaction, and moral responsibilities. 
 Another challenging aspect of measuring and ranking judicial per-
formance centers on how to choose the most appropriate performance 
standard referents. Perhaps due to the fact that we have well-
developed quantitative methods to assess individual performance 
relative to group performance, performance measurement has tradi-
tionally (and it seems stubbornly) relied upon extrinsic normative 
referents. Reference to extrinsic norms lends itself nicely to perform-
ance ranking. This is useful, because a ranking is a clear and concise 
manner in which to understand performance. Ranks are conceptually 
simple, and they are not readily misinterpretable; so in these terms, 
adopting a ranking approach maximizes the golden rules of meas-
urement: validity and reliability. Having said that, it seems strange 
to suggest that these normatively referenced performance measure-
ment “habits” that we have gotten into might indeed not be ideal 
when it comes to a tournament of judges. But consider this: While 
one’s performance ranking within a group is undoubtedly informa-
tive, it is limited, because assessing performance relative to a group 
norm and to observed group performance bounds assumes a com-
monality between the observed upper performance bound of the 
group and the potential upper performance bound of the highest flier. 
But what if the highest flier is in fact underperforming in terms of 
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his or her own potential performance bound? What if he or she could 
do better, but simply does not need to in order to maintain a number 
one ranking?  
 This brings us fundamentally to the raison d’être of a tournament 
of judges. One fundamental purpose of a tournament of judges indeed 
should be to identify those ripe for promotion—and these are likely 
the normatively referenced highfliers. Another purpose, of course, 
should be to identify those who are dragging their heels. But the as-
sumption that the highfliers never drag their heels is a dangerous 
one. Certainly in competitive sports, it is entirely conceivable that 
some elite athletes could perform well below their personal best yet 
claim a gold medal. It should be no different within other domains. 
Hence, in terms of the performance referent “sensibility,” it seems 
imperative to look beyond extrinsic referents and to also consider the 
assessment of performance in terms of self-referenced potential per-
formance parameters.  
 While such traditional nomothetic methods as the use of Z-score-
type analysis tell part of the performance story—and probably tell it 
well for “run of the mill” judges—a tournament of judges, in which 
such methods are to be exclusively adopted as the tool to identify the 
shining and not-so-shining stars, seems to require a set of tools not to 
be found in the typical bag of tricks of the nomothetic research ana-
lyst. One way of measuring performance within a tournament of 
judges that attempts to tackle these issues may be to adopt the “idio-
thetic” approach developed by Lamiell.125 This approach, developed 
and utilized for the most part in the psychology literature pertaining 
to personality, represents a blending of the idiographic and nomo-
thetic research paradigms. Unlike either pure idiography, with its 
case study methods and focus on the qualitative understanding of 
development and performance, or pure nomothesis, with its aggre-
gate statistical methods and focus on the group, Lamiell’s idiothesis 
provides a vehicle for the marriage of these seemingly incommensur-
able research positions.126 Lamiell has presented a statistical model 
for the study of individual differences in performance that shifts the 
study referent from some measure of central tendency to the self.127 
In simple terms, the model assesses performance not in terms of 
what others do, but in terms of what a person tends not to do but 
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could do.128 In presenting this model, two main advances are made: 
first, the individual differences “error” variation that is suppressed in 
traditional inferential statistical models becomes friend, and not foe; 
second, the positivist scientific rigor that is “compromised” using 
idiography is retained.129 In terms of a tool for assessing performance 
within a tournament of judges, this approach has several advan-
tages. First, it can be applied to populations as small as N = 1, and 
hence the naturally occurring small population of judges is no longer 
a methodological stumbling block. Second, it does not place unrealis-
tic performance expectations or impose unfair value judgments upon 
those judges who will never be highfliers. Third, it does not allow the 
highfliers to stop too often to smell the roses, live off their reputation, 
or do any of the things that past successes might tempt us all to do 
every once in a while. 
 The challenge, of course, is how we determine what one could do; 
or how we construct an index to estimate the bounds of individual 
performance expectations. This is an area that has received scant 
scholarly attention and, to my knowledge, none within the area of ju-
dicial performance.130 Certainly the magic answer is not to be found 
in this Essay; but my purpose will be served if it stirs the reader in 
any way to consider the possibilities that such a model may present 
for better measurement of judicial performance. Any index of what 
one could do needs necessarily to account for both individual differ-
ences and accepted norms of what the peer group can do and has 
done. Yes, there is certainly a place for extrinsically referenced 
norms within idiothesis. After all, one only gets to be a judge because 
many years before one scored high enough relative to one’s peers to 
attend law school, and so on. Thus current measures of judicial per-
formance discussed earlier in this Essay probably have a place in the 
model, as does past performance, since generally there is a high posi-
tive correlation between one’s past and future performance.131 But, 
these should be assessed relative to individual differences in the cog-
nitive, motivational, and social peculiarities of each judge that affect 
day-to-day functioning, as well as relative to peer norms. Again, 
while research is scant in terms of applications to judges, there is a 
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large body of literature that demonstrates that occupational per-
formance is affected by such things as individual differences in moti-
vation and personality,132 as well as external life events.133 Each of 
these contextual factors will bear upon what a judge could do. And 
each of them will be different for different judges. 
 Finally, if one were able to construct such an index, how would 
one use it as a decisionmaking tool within a tournament of judges? In 
terms of identifying those who appear to be underperforming, the in-
dex would be useful in determining whether intervention would be 
likely to address that underperformance. If underperformance is 
identified relative to a self-referenced performance bound, then it 
may be that manipulation of a contextual factor—say, motivation—
would improve performance. Once improved, this judge may be an 
ideal candidate for promotion. But if underperformance is identified 
relative to a group-referenced performance bound, and if contextual 
factors cannot explain the underperformance, then it simply may be 
that current performance levels are being maximized. This person is 
clearly not one bound for promotion. The high flier who excels rela-
tive to both the group and self-referents may not be the ideal candi-
date for promotion in the long term. While there will always be those 
who will excel normatively without maximum effort, they are few 
and far between. It may well be that the judge who performs consis-
tently at a self-referenced best will be the one whose career is cut 
short by occupational burnout or one of the many stress-related dis-
eases well demonstrated to be associated with the Type A “worka-
holic” personality.134 Maybe the judge most deserved of promotional 
attention is the one who is a good performer relative to the group, 
but slightly less so in relation to the self. Clearly this judge has the 
intellectual wherewithal necessary for promotion. The key to under-
standing this person is to understand what is holding him or her 
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back. Perhaps he or she is bored and a new and more fulfilling role 
will spark his or her occupational enthusiasm. Perhaps he or she is 
experiencing non-work-related problems—the impact of which may 
well dissipate with intervention. There are many “perhapses,” and 
the discussion of the many possibilities is beyond the scope of this 
Essay. The challenge is to concentrate research efforts on identifying 
the most salient “perhapses” for judges. Once we have a better un-
derstanding of these factors, our task in constructing the most par-
simonious idiothetic performance model will be all the easier. 
VI.   INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF MEASURING AND RANKING JUDICIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
 Choi and Gulati emphasise the positive incentive effects of their 
proposed tournament: 
We . . . believe that a judicial tournament would provide appellate 
judges with the otherwise absent external incentive to exert 
greater effort than they currently do. If high effort as a circuit 
judge (for example, publishing more opinions or hearing oral ar-
gument in more cases) is a criterion for promotion, rewarding ef-
fort with a higher ranking would induce circuit judges to work 
harder at their jobs.135 
If, in fact, judges do behave as homo economicus, it is reasonable to 
expect that a tournament with the elements proposed by Choi and 
Gulati should generate positive incentive effects, at least for appel-
late judges whose opinions are read and cited. At the very least, a 
high objective ranking in such an exercise brings professional respect 
and increased visibility, which in turn contribute to the prospects of 
promotion. Choi and Gulati make the good point that while judges 
sitting on the same court probably already have a good sense of each 
other’s abilities, objective rankings can have positive incentive effects 
even on mid-level judges with little chance of promotion, because 
they can use the rankings to market themselves to those outside the 
court, such as potential law clerks.136  
 There is, however, a problem. Choi and Gulati’s application of 
their tournament137 produces such interesting results, which are use-
ful in providing objective criteria in relation to who would make a 
good Supreme Court Justice, precisely because the rules of the tour-
nament were not preannounced. If the President were to announce 
that from now on Supreme Court Justices would be appointed based 
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on the outcome of a Choi and Gulati-type tournament of judges, be-
cause of the very fact that judges do behave as homo economicus, it 
would have both positive and negative effects on judicial behavior. 
Williamson describes the new homo economicus as someone who en-
gages in “self-interest seeking with guile.”138 This brings us back to 
the point made in Part II that homo economicus will behave in an 
opportunistic manner to achieve his self-interested objectives.  
 One potential adverse implication concerns the negative effect of 
increased competition. Choi and Gulati suggest that one of the posi-
tive spin-offs of their tournament is that it will provide incentives to 
compete and that this will result in higher levels of effort.139 In the 
spirit of the Alchian and Demsetz model of team production,140 the fo-
cus here is clearly on reducing shirking and improving allocative effi-
ciency on the court. This, however, might come at the cost of reduced 
productive efficiency if a more competitive environment has a nega-
tive effect on the level of collaboration and potential for collective 
learning on the court. Chen shows that participants in tournaments 
have incentives to sabotage others in a bid to improve their own rela-
tive position.141 Choi and Gulati seek to downplay this possibility, 
suggesting that judges are unlikely to undermine their colleagues.142 
But, if one accepts that judges behave as homo economicus, there is 
no reason to think that judges would behave differently from others 
interacting in small social groups. There is plenty of anecdotal evi-
dence to suggest that courts, like other social organizations, have 
been affected by personality differences, which a tournament that 
promoted competition may exacerbate. The High Court of Australia 
for much of its history has been impaired by personal tensions and 
petty jealousies between the judges that have adversely affected its 
work.143 One (albeit extreme) example was Isaacs, who was a Justice 
of the Court from 1906-1931 and Chief Justice from 1930-1931.144 His 
biographer notes that he would hide cases and play down the signifi-
cance of issues in argument so as to give himself a head start relative 
to the other judges when it came to writing opinions.145 
 Making the number of published opinions the criteria for measur-
ing good performance can also have negative side effects. If the focus 
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is on counting opinion numbers, there is always the potential, in the 
United States setting, that it will promote a publish-or-perish men-
tality, where the number of published opinions increases but the 
overall quality of those opinions decreases. One might argue that a 
judge will not submit “substandard” opinions for publication, because 
publishing poor-quality opinions would hurt his or her reputation. 
But this assumes a certain degree of farsightedness, because the 
reputation effect is likely to occur only with a lag, while in practice 
judges confronted with the prospect of improving their finishing posi-
tion in the next tournament may well be myopic. Even if the sugges-
tion made earlier of having multitiered law reports containing opin-
ions of different quality was considered fanciful,146 a more realistic 
solution to this problem would be to set the initial hurdle for publica-
tion higher.  
 A related problem with focusing on opinion counts is the potential 
adverse incentives this has for managing caseloads. Even in higher 
courts, where the opinions of judges are read, opinions published 
might not be the best measure of productivity if time spent on craft-
ing elaborate opinions is at the expense of case management. One of 
the main reasons for criticism of longer opinions in the High Court of 
Australia since the 1990s has been the view that the time taken to 
write longer opinions affects the capacity of judges to deal with their 
overall caseloads within a reasonable period of time.147 The argument 
is that longer, multiple opinions which contain excessive citation are 
responsible for an increase in the average time elapsed “between the 
conclusion of [the] hearing and pronouncement of a judgment which 
has been reserved.”148 This is a sensitive issue in Australia, as in the 
United States, where increasing backlogs have intensified commu-
nity pressure for speedier justice.149 In 1998, court delays came under 
increased media scrutiny in Australia, when New South Wales Su-
preme Court Justice Vince Bruce faced a State Parliament vote to 
remove him from office for taking up to three years to deliver a 
judgment.150 This has forced courts to monitor delays. In an attempt 
to address this issue, judges of the New South Wales Supreme Court 
are now required to make monthly progress reports on delivery of 
their judgments and time limits have been placed on the time period 
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between committal hearings and the trial in criminal cases.151 Simi-
lar procedures operate in the United States. For example, on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, a 
judge who has three or more assigned opinions pending that are not 
in circulation is not allowed to sit on any new cases until the backlog 
is cleared.152 
 One might argue that the approach to avoid the problem of judges 
publishing large numbers of poor-quality decisions is to put more 
emphasis on citation counts. The reasoning is that poor-quality deci-
sions will not get cited, so the marginal return from expending effort 
on publishing poor-quality decisions will be low. But if the focus is 
solely on citation counts, this also presents problems. Kobayashi and 
Lott suggest that judges who want to maximize citation counts to 
their own decisions will have an incentive to replace existing prece-
dents with their own inefficient decisions, which will generate more 
litigation and hence more opportunities to be cited.153 While Posner 
argues that most judges would not behave in this fashion,154 it is rea-
sonable to expect that judges confronted with a tournament that ex-
plicitly rewards citation counts and “self-interest seeking with guile” 
would implement strategies to maximize their citation count. One 
possible strategy is the formation of citation clubs, where members 
cite each other’s opinions to the exclusion of others on the court. To 
some extent this exists already. Studies for the United States courts 
of appeals155 and Federal Court of Australia156 have found that judges 
who attended elite law schools receive more citations. This might be 
because the judges from elite schools are more able, or it might be 
because like-minded judges cite each other. Landes, Lessig, and 
Solimine prefer the latter explanation, suggesting that on the United 
States courts of appeals, graduates from Harvard and Yale form 
“part of [a] large network of ‘like-thinking’ judges who will tend to 
cite each other more often than they cite other judges.”157 Choi and 
Gulati, while acknowledging that judges might cite similar-minded 
colleagues who agree to reciprocate, argue that this might in fact 
hurt a judge’s prospect of winning the tournament, because the judge 
will not be citing the best opinions available; therefore, the quality of 
the output will fall.158 But, this is only true if the probability of being 
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cited is purely a function of the quality of the opinion, which need not 
be the case in the presence of citation clubs.  
 There are parallels here with the “insider”-“outsider” distinction 
in legal scholarship; that is, the argument that while “outsiders”—
critical legal theorists, feminists, and critical race theorists—are pro-
ducing good scholarship, it is not being cited by “insiders.”159 Levit 
suggests that, as a result, “[r]eliance on quantitative assessments of 
legal scholarship may tend to subtly perpetuate existing hierarchies 
of race, gender, and theory prominence, while telling little about the 
substantive or foundational qualities of a theory.”160 There is no evi-
dence of gender or racial discrimination in citation counts on the 
courts,161 but the point about theory building is arguably true for ci-
tations to judicial opinions, with “outsiders” holding nonmainstream 
views or employing unorthodox opinion-writing techniques being 
overlooked. An illustration of an “outsider” on the High Court of Aus-
tralia was Lionel Murphy, who was a Justice from 1975-1986. Mur-
phy largely ignored the doctrine of precedent, arguing from first 
principles.162 At the time he was often in dissent, but many of his 
ideas have since gained acceptance in the Court’s jurisprudence, al-
beit in more complex forms.163 Murphy, however, is rarely cited as be-
ing the originator of those ideas.164   
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 The concept of a tournament of judges is a useful one. In the 
United States, where the judicial appointment process has become so 
politicized, and even in the Antipodes, where judicial appointments 
are not as politicized but still nontransparent, the use of objective in-
dicators of performance would make a positive contribution to the se-
lection process. However, as Choi and Gulati freely admit, a tourna-
ment of judges is not the be-all and end-all when it comes to deciding 
who are the best performers.165 A potential problem with explicit reli-
ance on a tournament, which this Essay has emphasized, is that it 
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can result in game playing.166 But, as Choi and Gulati state, “Our 
primary goal is not to produce winners, but to enable transparency in 
the nomination process.”167 Given that each of the quantitative indi-
cators have positive and negative points, it is important to use a 
range of quantitative indicators, as Choi and Gulati do in their “com-
posite measures,”168 in order to obviate the limitations of any one 
measure.  
 While the tools exist to evaluate qualitative dimensions of judicial 
performance, research in this area is less advanced due, at least in 
part, to more restricted data availability relative to counting cita-
tions and opinions. One approach discussed in this Essay to tackle 
the qualitative dimension of judging, which has not been utilized to 
this point, is to borrow idiothetic methods from psychology. It is an 
important step forward, both conceptually and methodologically, to 
further refine idiothetic methods that may enable us to move beyond 
the typically accepted tradition of “extrinsic normative comparison” 
that persists in performance evaluation. Such comparison, which 
lends itself to conclusions based upon ranking procedures, seems my-
opic with respect to identification of negative change among high-
level performers and positive change among low-level performers as 
well as over acceptance of the status quo. In the end, subject to these 
reservations, the most appropriate role for the tournament proposed 
by Choi and Gulati might be to help generate a pool of qualified can-
didates, from which candidates for promotion can be selected. Fi-
nally, this Essay has discussed the tournament in the specific context 
of the Australian and New Zealand legal setting, where several insti-
tutional arrangements differ from the United States. These different 
institutional arrangements do not mean that a tournament of judges 
has no relevance to the Antipodes. On the contrary, I have argued 
quite the opposite, but what they do highlight is that the design of a 
tournament, in whichever court it is played, needs to be tailored to 
meet the specific institutional context in which the court operates. 
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